Palestinians walk past rubble as they return to their neighborhood, following Israeli forces’ withdrawal from the area, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip October 11, 2025.(photo credit: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY)
Granting statehood before a stable, non-corrupt, non-jihadist Palestinian leadership is in place would reward movements committed to Israel’s destruction.
In the run-up to France’s recognition of a Palestinian state, President Emmanuel Macron argued that such recognition was “the best way to isolate Hamas” and insisted that the West Bank “has nothing to do with Hamas.”
The intent was to separate Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) from Gaza. But this is a dangerous misreading of the reality on the ground.
In the West Bank, Hamas’s popularity – and power – remains strong. Past surveys by the respected Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) show that Hamas could emerge victorious if new elections are soon held there. This means that any premature Palestinian state risks devolving into another “Hamastan.”
These realities highlight the danger of the international campaign to recognize a Palestinian state or push for a two-state solution at this point. Granting statehood before a stable, non-corrupt, non-jihadist Palestinian leadership is in place would reward movements committed to Israel’s destruction, not the peaceful resolution envisioned by well-meaning elites in Europe and the UN.
Genuine statehood requires functioning institutions; a free press; freedom of speech without fear of assassination; transparent governance to end the entrenched kleptocracy of both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA); and, above all, an unambiguous willingness to end the conflict by recognizing Israel as the Jewish state and signing a final peace agreement that ends all claims.
Security before statehood
The existential threat posed by premature statehood is not theoretical; it is already embedded in the current security environment. Advocates of immediate statehood often argue that a Palestinian state would be “demilitarized.” But who would enforce such a promise?
Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza offers a cautionary precedent. Supporters claimed that if even a single rocket were fired at Israel after withdrawal, the world would back Israel’s right to respond.
Instead, within three years, the Goldstone Commission accused Israel of war crimes for defending its citizens against Hamas rockets. The international community ignored Hamas’s charter calling for Israel’s destruction, and blamed Israel for Gaza’s transformation into a terror stronghold.
The risks in the West Bank are exponentially greater. The Western edge of the territory overlooks Israel’s coastal plain, placing 80% of the Israeli population within range of crude rockets and mortars.
A Palestinian state that failed or refused to dismantle armed factions would directly threaten Israel’s heartland.
Armed groups
Before statehood can even be contemplated, the armed factions that dominate the West Bank must be dismantled. These include Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and hybrid groups that constantly reconstitute under new names in Nablus, Tulkarm, Hebron, and Jenin. They are responsible for ambushes, shootings, bombings, the killing of alleged Palestinian collaborators, and arms and drug smuggling.
The Palestinian Authority is no alternative. Far from being a moderating force, the PA incites hatred through schools, mosques, and media, while maintaining its infamous “pay for slay” policy that rewards terrorists and their families with higher payments for deadlier attacks.
Worse than this, PA security officers themselves have participated in assaults on Israelis. When advocates of unilateral recognition claim that the PA will reform, they offer little more than wishful thinking. The current leadership refuses to step aside, and Palestinian society shows growing hostility toward reconciliation.
International law
Critics often describe Israel’s presence in the West Bank as an “illegal occupation,” but this is inaccurate.
Following the Ottoman Empire’s collapse, the 1920 San Remo Conference and the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine recognized the Jewish people’s right to reconstitute their national home in this territory. No sovereign state ever legally controlled the West Bank. Jordan’s 1948–1967 control over the area was never recognized internationally, and the 1949 armistice lines were explicitly not international borders. The land remains disputed, not stolen.
This was reinforced by UN Security Council Resolution 242 after the 1967 Six Day War, which called for negotiations to establish “secure and recognized boundaries.” Moreover, Israel has repeatedly offered statehood, but it was the Palestinian leadership that rejected each proposal.
Even if Palestinian society embraced moderation tomorrow, Israel could not surrender control of strategic terrain. Security requires a permanent Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, which forms part of its longest border, and on the high ground overlooking it. The E-1 corridor east of Jerusalem is equally vital, ensuring rapid military access from the coastal plain to the Jordan frontier. Without these areas, Israel’s borders would be indefensible.
Realistic options
In US President Donald Trump’s first term, he tried to address the realities with his Peace to Prosperity plan. It envisioned a demilitarized Palestinian entity while allowing Israel to retain 30% of the West Bank, including strategic areas. Imperfect though it was, it offered a realistic framework, recognizing that peace is impossible if Israel is left vulnerable.
Calls to annex the entire West Bank in response to unilateral recognition are equally misguided. Absorbing millions of Palestinians who reject Israel’s legitimacy would destabilize the state and create a demographic crisis.
The so-called “emirate model,” proposed as an alternative to a Palestinian state, appears more aspirational than realistic, at least in the near term. A more practical, though internationally unpopular option would be the limited annexation of Area C, under the near-exclusive control of Israel, which comprises roughly 60% of the West Bank. Such a move would secure Israel’s strategic depth, encompass all Jewish communities, and leave Areas A and B under Palestinian administration until meaningful reforms occur.
International pressure
The danger of premature recognition is not only security related but diplomatic. Europe, Israel’s largest trading partner, increasingly frames Israel as a colonial, apartheid state. Unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood would deepen Israel’s isolation and fuel boycotts and sanctions.
Nor is the risk limited to Europe. Once Trump leaves office, future US administrations, whether progressive Democrats or isolationist Republicans, may adopt Europe’s precedent. A unilateral American recognition of Palestinian statehood would constrain Israel’s options and undermine its security.
That is why President Trump’s remaining three years in office are critical. His administration can consolidate support for Israel by codifying into policy the principle articulated by former secretary of state Mike Pompeo in 2019: “The establishment of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank is not, per se, inconsistent with international law.” This recognition should be reaffirmed and enshrined in US policy.
The Trump administration’s more recent 20-point plan recognizes that Palestinian statehood is a long-term prospect, contingent on deep reform, demilitarization, and genuine recognition of Israel.
Premature recognition, as some European states have pursued, does not advance peace. It risks fueling renewed conflict. Israel’s survival, and the eventual possibility of a viable two-state solution, depend on patience and a security-first approach.
This does not mean annexing the entire West Bank. It means acknowledging that Israel’s retention of strategic land over the Green Line is lawful and essential. A secure Israel is not only in Israel’s interest but also in America’s, strengthening regional stability against Iran and jihadist aggression.
The path to Palestinian statehood is long, and it must begin with reform, demilitarization, and genuine recognition of Israel as a neighbor. Until then, rewarding Palestinians with sovereignty would not advance peace but trigger renewed conflict. Israel’s survival and the eventual possibility of a true two-state solution require patience and a security-first approach.■
This article originally appeared in the Jerusalem Report and the Jerusalem Post.
The writer is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy aides, and the State Department.