A SYRIAN flag is displayed outside the White House after the meeting of US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa last week. November is shaping up as a holiday season for Arab governments, says the writer. (photo credit: KEVIN LAMARQUE/REUTERS)
If Trump’s goal is lasting stability, he must address his longstanding blind spot toward the Islamist leaderships of Qatar and Turkey.
November 2025 is shaping up to be a holiday season for Arab governments in the Middle East. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, recently removed from the US foreign terrorist designation list, received the high honor of a White House visit, where President Donald Trump praised him as a “good, tough guy.”
And on the topic of White House visits, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is also heading to Washington. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia will receive the long-sought US defense pact, at least as much as the president can provide without congressional approval. This has topped the Saudi wish-list since 2019, when Iran struck the kingdom’s oil facilities and Trump, in his first term, chose not to retaliate militarily.
Then, the expected price for F-35 jets, a civilian nuclear program, and defense guarantees was normalization with Israel. Today, the price appears to be hundreds of billions in Saudi investment in the United States, with full normalization delayed. But that is not enough.
It is possible that MBS – after securing Trump’s support for a pathway to a Palestinian state in the president’s 20-point framework and in the draft UNSC resolution creating an International Stabilization Force – will offer partial or phased normalization.
Before October 7, 2023, Saudi officials told me directly that they see themselves as leaders of the Arab, and arguably the broader Muslim world. As such, the cost of bringing Riyadh into the Abraham Accords was always going to be far higher than what was required from the UAE.
Trump’s blindspot
This rivalry among Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey for influence in the Levant is intense.
If Trump’s goal is lasting stability, he must address his longstanding blind spot toward the Islamist leaderships of Qatar and Turkey. If these actors are allowed to take leading roles in the reconstruction of Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, the outcome will be the gradual radicalization of those territories, different in form but no less dangerous than when Iran controlled their politics through Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime.
In September, Qatar, already designated as being a major non-NATO ally by the Biden administration despite its sponsorship of Hamas and numerous jihadists with American blood on their hands, received an extraordinary American defense pact.
It effectively equates an attack on Qatar with an attack on the United States. Washington also approved an airbase in Idaho for joint training with the US Air Force.
Yet in exchange for nearly a trillion dollars in promised Qatari investment, Washington received no pledge from Doha to end its support for terrorist groups, distance itself from Tehran’s Shi’ite jihadists, or normalize relations with Israel.
Some point to supposed moderation at Al Jazeera, but as Toby Dershowitz of The Foundation for Defense of Democracies notes, such claims are wishful thinking as there is no clear change underway and “many of those driving day-to-day coverage remain emotionally or ideologically tied to the Hamas narrative.”
As Gregg Roman of the Middle East Forum put it, “Qatar positions itself as an indispensable mediator precisely because it sustains the very terrorist networks requiring mediation. It’s protection racketeering disguised as diplomacy. The Qatari sovereign wealth fund pours millions into American universities, creating intellectual capture that prevents honest assessment of this dysfunction.”
Puzzling concession: Al-Shaara
The most puzzling American concession may be to Syria’s al-Shaara, who lacks oil or gas wealth. His supporters portray him as a reformed jihadist who has become a pragmatic leader. His critics argue that jihadists do not change their stripes; they merely wait for the right moment to reveal them.
What is indisputable is that al-Shaara emerged from the ISIS and al-Qaeda ecosystem and recently permitted allied militias to massacre two vulnerable Syrian minority communities – the Druze and the Alawites. Yet both Democrats and Republicans have joined the administration in offering sanctions relief and facilitating reconstruction funding without meaningful reciprocity, hoping that such relief and new resources will prevent renewed anarchy.
This raises a central question about Washington’s renewed Middle East engagement: What is the United States actually getting in return? Is this merely a bid for hundreds of billions in investment? And is it wise to risk American prestige, and possibly American soldiers, on the promises of authoritarian regimes?
Several issues should give policymakers pause. If Saudi Arabia receives F-35 stealth fighters, will its deepening strategic relationship with China, which has helped bring Riyadh closer to Iran, risk exposing sensitive US technology? Will selling advanced aircraft undermine America’s commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge? And what happens if the Saudi monarchy destabilizes after the United States helps establish a nuclear program on the Arabian Peninsula?
The case of Qatar
In Qatar’s case, Washington has offered carrots without consequences. Hamas leaders still live comfortably in Doha. Offering gratitude to Qatar for “pressuring” Hamas, after years of the group using civilians as human shields in hospitals, schools, and mosques, should not be considered a concession. It is now clear that Qatar could have used its influence long ago to facilitate the release of kidnapped, raped, and brutalized Israeli civilians. They chose not to, and the United States chose not to insist.
I remain baffled that neither Democratic nor Republican administrations have ever applied real pressure on the Emir or his mother, who oversees the Qatar Foundation and exports Muslim Brotherhood ideology into Western educational institutions.
Saudi Arabia, under MBS, has undertaken significant reforms since 9/11 and has demonstrated that, even as an authoritarian state, it can be a reliable US partner, provided it severs its security relationships with China.
For Qatar, the baseline for reciprocity must include ending support for terrorist groups and transforming the Al Jazeera media empire into a platform that does not promote anti-American and antisemitic conspiracy theories.
When it comes to Syria, Washington should require verifiable steps to safeguard minority communities and secure the frontier with Israel. A credible option would be a US base inside Syria to enforce a demilitarized zone south of Damascus, an arrangement modeled on the buffer Israel negotiated in the Sinai following the 1979 peace accord.
Quoting Seth Frantzman
As Seth Frantzman wrote in The National Interest in “The Re-Americanization of the Middle East,” “the Trump administration is now playing a central role in winding down regional conflicts. But high-level engagement carries real risks.”
America’s relationships with the Syrians, Qataris, Egyptians, Saudis, Jordanians, Emiratis, Turks, and most others in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are transactional. They are based on temporary convergences of interests, not shared values. These governments are aware that a new Congress and administration will take office in a few years. They also know that the American public has little appetite for putting US troops on the ground – and they will hedge accordingly.
Washington must acknowledge this reality. This means crafting agreements that are bipartisan, durable, and resilient enough to withstand political transitions. These deals must include meaningful reciprocity, not just financial incentives. America’s strategic investments must yield long-term commitments, not fleeting promises.
Only by insisting on real reciprocity can the United States ensure that its deepening involvement in the Middle East strengthens rather than undermines American interests and regional stability.
This article appeared in the Jerusalem Post on November 17, 2025.
The writer is the director of the Middle East Political Information Network and the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress and their foreign policy advisers, as well as the State Department.