ISRAEL’S AMBASSADOR to the US Yechiel Leiter departs after a visit to the US Capitol last week. If Washington signals restraint or pressures Jerusalem to temper its response to provocations, Iran will interpret it as a green light to escalate, the writer warns. (photo credit: Nathan Howard/Reuters)
Will the US support Israel’s new post-October 7 doctrine of preemption and deterrence, or will Washington revert to urging Israeli restraint once ceasefires are established?
John Spencer, head of West Point’s Urban Warfare Institute, wrote that the US and Israel “achieved overwhelming success at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels… shatter[ing] the myth of Iran’s invulnerability.” Yet, as The Wall Street Journal observed, despite the blow to the “pillars of Iran’s theocracy, the regime remains intact – wounded but capable of regrouping in more dangerous and unpredictable ways.”
This moment calls for strategic clarity, not triumphalism. Tactical gains must not lead to strategic complacency. As ceasefires take hold across the region, US and Israeli policymakers must approach “the day after” with foresight and humility, recognizing that the forces driving instability remain deeply entrenched.
History offers a sobering precedent. Following Israel’s stunning 1967 victory in the Six Day War, overconfidence contributed to the devastating surprise of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Today, the cost of misjudging the threat is even higher. Iran’s leadership is already working to reconstitute its nuclear infrastructure, rebuild its missile stockpiles, and accelerate arms transfers to its regional proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, and others.
If Washington signals restraint or pressures Jerusalem to temper its response to provocations – for diplomatic, electoral, or political reasons – Iran will interpret that as a green light to escalate.
We’ve seen this dynamic before. In the 1990s, Israel was urged to overlook terrorism from Hamas and the Palestinian Authority to preserve the Oslo peace process, contributing to the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) offered Iran a legal glide path to nuclear capability and billions in sanctions relief, much of which funded proxy warfare across the region.
After Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, the doctrine of “mowing the grass” (periodic limited operations to manage rather than eliminate Hamas) proved insufficient. The devastating October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas made that clear.
More than a year before October 7, Israeli intelligence reportedly downplayed Hamas’s plans for a major assault as a mere “raid.” In the North, repeated Hezbollah provocations, including placing armed outposts (“tents”) on Israeli territory, elicited little response. I witnessed the tension firsthand while visiting Har Dov just four days before the October 7 massacre.
Will the US back Israel?
Today, the key question remains: Will the US support Israel’s new post-October 7 doctrine of preemption and deterrence, or will Washington revert to urging Israeli restraint once ceasefires are established?
US President Donald Trump’s recent suggestion that China should be allowed to purchase Iranian oil is concerning, especially just days after US forces targeted Iran’s underground nuclear sites. Current US sanctions prohibit such transactions.
Whether under president Joe Biden or potentially under President Trump again, a failure to enforce these sanctions would enable Iran to rebuild its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, expand its network of terrorism, and increase its influence in the region.
Why would Washington tolerate China financing Iran’s resurgence through discounted crude oil? The answer likely lies in domestic political calculations aimed at keeping oil prices low. However, the strategic consequences are significant and could bring the next conflict in the Middle East much closer.
A potential rift may be developing between Netanyahu and Trump regarding whether Israel can launch preventive actions against Iranian provocations, similar to its current operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah. The recent joint US and Israeli strikes on Iranian assets provide a model for future strategic cooperation, one based not only on reactive defense but also on calibrated deterrence.
Adversaries like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are already preparing for the next round by silencing dissent at home, rebuilding arsenals abroad, and exploiting any division between Washington and Jerusalem. The only question is how soon the next conflict will erupt.
The US should clearly support Israel’s doctrine of preemption following the events of October 7, even after ceasefires are established. This includes the ongoing military actions in southern Lebanon aimed at weakening Hezbollah’s capabilities. Extending this doctrine to Iran – not through open-ended wars, but through timely and targeted Israeli deterrence – would reduce the likelihood of a wider conflict and future US involvement.
Any perception of US vacillation will be interpreted as weakness and exploited. A steady, firm approach with preventive actions can help delay or avoid war.
This article originally appeared in the Jerusalem Post on July 1, 2025.
The writer is the director of the Middle East Political Information Network (MEPIN) and senior security editor for The Jerusalem Report. He briefs members of Congress and their foreign policy and national security staff.